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The unique features of quantum walk, such as the possibility of the walker to be in superposition of
the position space and get entangled with the position space, provides inherent advantages that can
be captured to design highly secure quantum communication protocols. Here we propose two quan-
tum direct communication protocols, a Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) protocol
and a Controlled Quantum Dialogue (CQD) protocol using discrete-time quantum walk on a cycle.
The proposed protocols are unconditionally secure against various attacks such as the intercept-
resend attack, the denial of service attack, and the man-in-the-middle attack. Additionally, the
proposed CQD protocol is shown to be unconditionally secure against an untrusted service provider
and both the protocols are shown more secure against the intercept resend attack as compared to
the qubit based LM05/DL04 protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research in quantum cryptography, which first started with the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
[1] was later followed up with the design and the study of various novel QKD schemes [2–4]. These protocols were
designed to securely generate a secret key between two parties, which would then be used to encode the message via a
one-time pad. Most of the research in quantum cryptography was concentrated on QKD, until during 2002-05, when
few new protocols were introduced [5–9]. These protocols were called Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC)
protocols. In 2002, the first QSDC protocol was proposed in the form of a deterministic key that could transmit the
secret message [5, 6]. In 2003, the standard form of QSDC without the requirement of a key was proposed [7] and
in 2004 and 2005 a single photon based protocol called DL04 was proposed [8]. Recently, the Device-independent
QSDC protocol [10] and measurement-device-independent QSDC protocol [11, 12] have also been proposed. In 2004,
a two-way quantum direct communication protocol was introduced, called the quantum dialogue(QD) [13]. Unlike
QSDC protocols where communication is just one way, in QD protocols both the parties interact with each other i.e.,
communication is two ways. This quantum dialogue protocol was extended to a controlled quantum dialogue protocol
(CQD), in which a third party provides the quantum services for communication [14]. The QSDC, QD and the CQD
protocols have shown that an unconditionally secure quantum communication can be achieved even without a key.
With the reporting of experimental realization of QSDC protocols [15–17], its significance for practical use is being
highlighted.
In 1993, the concept of quantum walks was introduced [18]. Quantum walks are the quantum analogues of classical
random walks. Unlike classical random walks where the walker is at just one deterministic position at a given time, in
quantum walks, the walker can be at multiple positions at the same time, i.e., in a superposition of position space. The
tossed quantum coin that decides the movement of the walker, can also be at a superposition of head and tails. These
unique features of quantum walks can help traverse multiple positions faster, a feature that has been exploited in the
design of various quantum search algorithms [19]. Quantum walks have also been used for studying and describing
various quantum phenomena [20, 21] and also in the study and design of quantum networks [22]. Surprisingly, the usage
of quantum walks for cryptography and secure communication has largely been unexplored, except for a few designs
of QKD protocols [23] and public-key cryptosystems [24]. In this work, we delve into an unexplored cryptographic
potential of quantum walks, which is the quantum direct communication. Using the discrete-time quantum walk on
a cycle, we propose two new protocols for QSDC and CQD and show the unconditional security they provide against
various attacks such as the intercept-resend attack, the denial of service attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. We
also show that the proposed CQD protocol provides unconditional security against an untrusted service provider and
both the protocols are more secure against the intercept resend attack as compared to the qubit based LM05/DL04
protocol [8, 9].
This paper is structured as follows: In section II, we introduce the preliminary concepts of discrete-time quantum
walk on a cycle required to understand the protocols proposed in section III. In section IV, we discuss the security
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2of the proposed protocols against various attacks. In section V, we conclude with our remarks. In the Appendix, we
provide relevant background details that can be referred to if required.
II. DISCRETE-TIME QUANTUM WALK ON A CYCLE - PRELIMINARIES
Quantum walks are a quantum analogue of the classical random walks. In discrete-time quantum walk on an
N -cycle, the walker moves along N discrete points on a cycle [25], which are represented by N -dimensional quantum
states |x〉, orthogonal to each other and belonging to the Hilbert space Hp where
Hp = span{|x〉, x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}}.
.
During each step of the discrete-time quantum walk, the walker moves one position either to his left or to his right
based on the result (|0〉 or |1〉) of the quantum coin, which is given by a two-dimensional quantum state |c〉 belonging
to the Hilbert space Hc where
Hc = span{|0〉, |1〉}.
If the walker is in a superposition of the coin state, it will move to both, left and right simultaneously, creating a
state which is in superposition in position space. Thus, the initial state of the walker starting at position xin and
with an initial coin state |cin〉 can be considered to be in a superposition of the two allowed basis states given by
|Ψin〉 = |xin〉 ⊗ |cin〉 = |xin〉|cin〉 ; |xin〉 ∈ Hp ; |cin〉 ∈ Hc. (1)
The dynamics of the walker during each step of the walk is governed by the action of the unitary operator, a
composition of a quantum coin operation on the coin space followed by a conditioned position shift operation on the
complete Hilbert space [26–28],
U = U(θ, ξ, ζ) = S(Ip ⊗Rc). (2)
Here Ip is the identity operator on position space and the quantum coin operation Rc is given by,
Rc = Rc(θ, ξ, ζ) =
[
eiξ cos θ eiζ sin θ
e−iζ sin θ e−iξ cos θ
]
. (3)
In simpler cases, when ζ = ξ = 0 or fixed to a specific value, Rc(θ, ξ, ζ) = Rc(θ) is the coin operator on the coin space.
The shift operator on H = Hp ⊗Hc, which shifts the position of the walker in the direction which is determined by
the coin state is given by
S =
N−1
Σ
x=0
(|x− 1( mod N)〉〈x| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ |x+ 1( mod N)〉〈x| ⊗ |1〉〈1|). (4)
The state after t steps of the walk on an N−cycle, in general, will be in the form,
|Ψt〉 = U t|Ψin〉 =
N∑
x=1
|x〉 ⊗
(
αx,t|0〉+ βx,t|1〉
)
, αx,t βx,t ∈ C ∀x, t (5)
and the probability of finding the walker at any position x after t steps of the walk will be P (x, t) = |αx,t|2 + |βx,t|2.
In addition to the quantum walk evolution operator, we will also define the translation operator and measurement
operator which will be needed for QSCD and CQD protocols. The translation operator T defined on the space Hp is
given as:
3T (y) =
N−1
Σ
x=0
|x+ y( mod N)〉〈x| (6)
and the measurement operator M is defined on the entire space H in the form given by
M = Mp ⊗Mc
where
Mp =
N−1
Σ
x=0
|x〉〈x| and Mc =
1
Σ
c=0
|c〉〈c|. (7)
Note that [T (y), U ] = 0 i.e., T (y) and U commute with each other [24].
III. THE PROTOCOLS
The extent of the spread of the discrete-time quantum walk in position space is mainly governed by the parameter
θ in the quantum coin operation [27, 28]. Therefore, in this paper, we will keep only the coin parameter θ as a variable
parameter while keeping the parameters ξ and ζ constant throughout the protocols. Here we first present the encoding
scheme, and then we present the protocols for QSDC and CQD. The schematic representation of the protocols for
QSDC and CQD is presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively. In both the figures, the “random path switcher” is a
device that switches the path of the quantum channel to move a particular state into encoding the message or into
checking eavesdropping, similar to using a physical lever that is used for changing the railway tracks. For example,
for linear and quantum optical implementations of quantum walks [29], various optical switches [30–32] coupled with
a quantum random number generator [33] can be used as a random path switcher.
A. Encoding of the message
The message m (or a part m of the total message) is encoded on a discrete-time quantum walk state |φ〉 = ∑
i
|xi〉|ci〉
by applying the translation operator T (m) on |φ〉, resulting in the state T (m)⊗ Ic|φ〉 =
∑
i
|xi +m( mod N)〉|ci〉.
B. Discrete-time quantum walk based QSDC protocol
1. Alice prepares n discrete-time quantum walk states. To prepare n quantum walk states, Alice randomly chooses
3n integers {t1, t2, ..., tn}, {x1, x2, ..., xn} and {c1, c2, ..., cn} such that xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}, ci ∈ {0, 1} and
ti ∈ N∪{0} ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and n random real numbers {θ1, θ2, ..., θn} such that θi ∈ [0, 2pi]. Thus, she prepares
n discrete-time quantum walk states [U(θi)]
ti |xi〉|ci〉 = U ti |xi〉|ci〉 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and sends these states to
Bob. (In the rest of this and the next protocol, we will refer to [U(θi)] as U).
2. On receiving the walk states from Alice, Bob randomly chooses n/2 of them for checking eavesdropping and
classically sends their corresponding coordinates i to Alice. Alice classically sends to Bob the corresponding
values of ti, xi, ci, and θi. Bob applies the corresponding operation U
−ti on those states, measures them, and
checks the measurement result with the value of xi and ci. If the error is within a tolerable limit, he continues
to step 3. Otherwise, the protocol is aborted and they will start the protocol all over again.
3. Out of the remaining n/2 walk states, Bob chooses n/4 of them for encoding the message. On each of those n/4
states, Bob codes a part of his message mi by applying the translation operator T (mi) ⊗ Ic. He does nothing
to the other n/4 states (let us call them decoy states). He then sends all the n/2 states back to Alice.
4FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the discrete-time quantum walk based QSDC protocol. The bold arrow lines represent quantum
channels whereas the dotted arrow lines represent classical channels
4. Once Alice confirms the receiving of the states, Bob classically sends the coordinates of the decoy states to
Alice. Alice applies the corresponding operator U−ti on the decoy states and checks for eavesdropping just like
how Bob does it in step 2.
5. Once no eavesdropping is confirmed, Alice then applies U−ti on the remaining n/4 message states and measures
them to obtain the message sent by Bob.
C. Discrete-time quantum walk based CQD protocol
1. Charlie prepares n discrete-time quantum walk states. To prepare n quantum walk states, Charlie randomly
chooses 3n integers {t1, t2, ..., tn}, {x1, x2, ..., xn} and {c1, c2, ..., cn} such that xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N−1}, ci ∈ {0, 1}
and ti ∈ N ∪ {0} ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and n random real numbers {θ1, θ2, ..., θn} such that θi ∈ [0, 2pi]. He prepares
n quantum walk states [U(θi)]
ti |xi〉|ci〉 = U ti |xi〉|ci〉 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and sends these states to Alice.
2. On receiving the walk states, Alice randomly chooses n/2 of them for checking eavesdropping and classically
sends their corresponding coordinates i to Charlie. Charlie classically sends to Alice the corresponding values of
ti, xi, ci, and θi. Alice applies the operation U
−ti on those states and measures them and checks the measurement
result with the value of xi and ci. If the error is within a tolerable limit, Alice continues to step 3. Otherwise,
the protocol is aborted and they restart the protocol from the beginning.
3. Out of the remaining n/2 walk states, Alice chooses n/4 of them for encoding the message. On each of those
n/4 states, Alice encodes a part of her message ai by applying the translation operator T (ai). She does nothing
to the other n/4 states (let us call them decoy states). She then chooses a random integer k and coin parameter
θr, applies [U(θr)]
k on all the n/2 states and sends the states to Bob.
4. Once Bob confirms the receiving of the states, Alice publicly announces the values of θr and k and the coordinates
of the decoy states. Charlie, upon receiving the announcement, sends the ti, xi, ci, and θi values of the decoy
states to Bob. Bob then applies the corresponding operator U−ti [U(θr)]−k on the decoy states and checks for
the presence of Eve just like how Alice does it in step 2.
5FIG. 2: Schematic diagram of the discrete-time quantum walk based CQD protocol. The bold arrow lines represent quantum
channels whereas the dotted arrow lines represent classical channels.
5. Meanwhile, Bob encodes his message bi on the remaining message states by applying the translation operator
T (bi). Once he confirms the absence of eavesdropping, Charlie sends the ti, xi, θi and ci values of the message
states to Bob. Bob applies the operator U−ti [U(θr)]−k on the message states, measures them and publicly
announces the measurement results ai + bi. Alice and Bob subtract ai and bi respectively from their results to
obtain each others’ messages.
Compared to LM05/DL04 protocols (see Appendix) which can transfer one bit per quantum state, the discrete-time
quantum walk protocol on a coin and position Hilbert space presented above can transfer more number of bits per
quantum state allowing for faster transmission of message. In addition to this, the security advantage is discussed
below.
IV. SECURITY
In this section, we analyse the security of our protocol against various attacks, namely the intercept-resend attack,
the denial of service attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and the attack by an untrusted Charlie.
A. Intercept-and-resend attack
In this attack, Eve intercepts the quantum channel and tries to extract information from the incoming state by
measuring it. Then, she re-prepares the appropriate state (based on the information she receives) and sends it to
the receiver. Our protocols are robust against this attack. This is because the discrete-time quantum walk states are
usually superposition states where the position and the coin Hilbert spaces are usually entangled. Hence, Eve can’t
determine the incoming state by measurement alone. Instead of directly measuring the state, Eve can apply U−ti and
then measure the state. But this attack also cannot be performed by Eve because the value of ti will be only known to
Alice at the time of attack. If Eve attempts to perform this attack, she will raise the error during the eavesdropping
checking of the control mode states, and hence will be caught.
61. Mutual Information between Alice and Eve
In practical scenarios, Alice can choose her parameters ti, xi, ci, and θi only from a finite set or a finite range of
values. Hence, the amount of mutual information IAE gained between Alice and Eve during the intercept-resend
attack is dependent upon the size of these sets and ranges. The higher the mutual information, the more will be
known by Eve about the state sent by Alice, thus making the protocol less secure. Let us consider a practical scenario
where Alice can choose:
• ti from the set T containing n(T ) integers (from 0 to n(T )− 1)
• xi from the set X ={0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1} (set of N values), N being the dimension of the position space
• ci from the set C ={0, 1} (set of 2 values)
• θi from the range Rθ = [θmin, θmax]
Let us say, that for a particular round of transmission, Alice chooses the values tA ∈ T , xA ∈ X, cA ∈ C, and θA ∈ Rθ
and prepares the state |ψA〉 = [U(θA)]tA |xA〉|cA〉. Now Eve can perform the intercept-resend attack in two ways,
1. directly measure the incoming state to obtain the position and coin values xE and cE respectively (Let us call
this strategy IR1) , or
2. randomly choose the values tE ∈ T , xE ∈ X, cE ∈ C, and θE ∈ Rθ and perform the operation [U(θE)]−tE |ψA〉
and then measure the position and coin values of the resulting state in order to obtain the values xE and cE
respectively (let us call this strategy IR2).
Let us now examine IR2. We can consider tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE , θA, and θE as uniformly distributed random vari-
ables, where tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE are discrete and θA and θE are continuous. Now, for IR2, the mutual information
IAE2 between Alice and Eve is given by,
IAE2 =
∑
tE∈T
∑
xE∈X
∑
cE∈C
∑
tA∈T
∑
xA∈X
∑
cA∈C
θmax∫
θA=θmin
θmax∫
θE=θmin
p(tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE , θA, θE)log2
p(tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE , θA, θE)
p(tA)p(xA)p(cA)p(tE)p(xE)p(cE)p(θA)p(θE)
dθAdθE , (8)
where p(a1, a2, ..., an) is the joint probability distribution-mass function of the random variables a1, a2, ..., an where
ai ∈ {tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE , θA, θE}.
For IR1, the mutual information IAE1 between Alice and Eve is given by,
IAE1 =
∑
xE∈X
∑
cE∈C
∑
tA∈T
∑
xA∈X
∑
cA∈C
θmax∫
θA=θmin
p(tA, xA, cA, xE , cE , θA)log2
p(tA, xA, cA, xE , cE , θA)
p(tA)p(xA)p(cA)p(xE)p(cE)p(θA)
dθA. (9)
The above formulas of IAE1 and IAE2 contain 1 and 2 integrals respectively. Due to lack of access to good computing
power to calculate IAE1 and IAE2 , we modify the protocol for the purpose of analysis of this attack, by keeping all
the coin parameters, including θ constant and publicly known throughout the protocol, thus reducing the number of
secret parameters and avoiding the integrals. Now, the revised formulas for IAE1 and IAE2 will be
IAE2 =
∑
tE∈T
∑
xE∈X
∑
cE∈C
∑
tA∈T
∑
xA∈X
∑
cA∈C
p(tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE)log2
p(tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE)
p(tA)p(xA)p(cA)p(tE)p(xE)p(cE)
(10)
and
7IAE1 =
∑
xE∈X
∑
cE∈C
∑
tA∈T
∑
xA∈X
∑
cA∈C
p(tA, xA, cA, xE , cE)log2
p(tA, xA, cA, xE , cE)
p(tA)p(xA)p(cA)p(xE)p(cE)
(11)
where
p(tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE) =
‘1
2N [n(T )]2
(〈xE |〈cE |U−tEU tA |xA〉|cA〉)2, (12)
p(tA, xA, cA, xE , cE) =
‘1
2N [n(T )]
(〈xE |〈cE |U tA |xA〉|cA〉)2 (13)
and
p(ai) =
∑
a1,,a2,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an
p(a1, a2, ..., an) (14)
where aj ∈ {tA, xA, cA, tE , xE , cE} and U = U(θ) where θ is the publicly known coin parameter throughout the
protocol. We can see that IAE1 and IAE2 are a function of n(T ) and N , and also depend on the fixed coin parameter
θ.
FIG. 3: (a) Mutual Information IAE vs coin parameter θ for N = 3, n(T ) = 7. (b) Mutual Information IAE vs the cycle length
N for n(T ) = 7, θ = pi
4
. The variation of IAE with θ is periodic with period
pi
2
with the peaks at even multiples of pi
4
and
minimum at odd multiples of pi
4
. The variation of IAE with N is fluctuating in the beginning, but later steadily increases. For
both the plots, the coin parameters ζ and ξ were set to a fixed value pi
4
.
In Fig. 3(a), we can see that IAE is at its lowest when θ is an odd multiple of
pi
4 and is at its highest (IAE = 1) when
θ is an even multiple of pi4 . Hence, for θ equal to even multiples of
pi
4 , the security of the protocol will be compromised.
This is consistent with the discrete-time quantum walk dynamics, for θ being even multiples of pi4 , the walk will either
be localized around the origin or will be ballistic without being in superposition of more than two position space at a
time [27, 28]. We can infer that the degree of spread of the walker in position space gives an enhanced security to the
protocol. In Fig. 3(b), we can see that for odd N , IAE increases with increase in N , whereas for even N , IAE initially
decreases with N , but then increases. In Fig. 4, we see that IAE decreases with n(T ) and its value is greater for even
N than for odd N . In fact, for odd N , the IAE drops much below 0.5 (which is the IAE value for the LM05/DL04
8protocol (see appendix)) for large n(T ), and in fact is less than 0.25 for n(T ) > 25. From Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 3, we
can see that IAE2 > IAE1 , implying that that IR2 is a better strategy for Eve than IR1 for odd N . This shows that,
for an odd, low value of N , and a high value of n(T ), and θ being an odd multiple of pi4 , our discrete-time quantum
walk protocols are more secure against the intercept-resend attack than the LM05/DL04 protocol (whose IAE = 0.5),
even with the modification that the coin parameters remain constant and publicly known throughout the protocol.
FIG. 4: Mutual Information IAE vs n(T ) for (a) N = 4 and (b) N = 3. The dash-dotted line (magenta coloured in online and
colour-printed versions) represents the IAE for one channel of the LM05/DL04 protocol, which is the same as the IAE for the
BB84 protocol. In both the figures, IAE decreases with n(T ), thus increasing security of the protocol with increase in n(T ).
For both the plots, the coin parameters θ, ζ and ξ were set to a fixed value pi
4
.
B. Denial of Service attack
Instead of trying to extract information from the incoming state, Eve can rather perform a denial-of-service attack
i.e., she can just stop the incoming state from going forward and can instead prepare and send a random discrete-time
quantum walk state. This attack also cannot be performed by Eve because if she does so, she introduces an added
error and noise into the channel, and hence the eavesdropping checking performed by the sender and the receiver at
each quantum channel will detect Eve.
C. Man-in-the-middle attack
Let’s consider the QSDC protocol. In this attack, Eve initially puts the incoming state from Alice into her quantum
memory. Then, she sends her own walk state to Bob. Bob, assuming that Alice may have sent this state, encodes
his message on this state and sends it back to Alice. Eve intercepts that channel also and reads the message. She
then encodes the message onto Alice’s state which she had earlier stored in her quantum memory and sends it back
to Alice, thus being able to read the message. Eve can perform a similar kind of attack in the CQD protocol to
obtain the message of one of the two communicating parties. In both cases of this attack, Eve will be detected by the
communicating parties during eavesdropping checking. Hence both our protocols are unconditionally secure against
this attack.
D. Attack by an untrusted Charlie
Let us consider the QDC protocol. In this attack, Charlie intercepts the Alice-Bob channel, applies U−ti on the
incoming state, and obtains Alice’s message by measuring the state. Then, he re-prepares the state and sends it to
Bob. Then when Bob encodes his message bi and announces the value ai + bi, Charlie can then get Bob’s message
9as well. But our QDC protocol is robust against this attack because as Alice applies an additional [U(θr)]
k to the
states, Charlie will not know the value of θr or k and hence he cannot apply [U(θr)]
−k to retrieve the state.
V. CONCLUSION
The unique features of a discrete-time quantum walk such as spreading the quantum state in the superposition of
position space and entanglement generation between the position and the coin states have an immense unexplored
potential for quantum security for communication and cryptographic protocols. In this work, we have explored its
potential for providing cryptographic security by proposing two new protocols, a one-way two-party Quantum Secure
Direct Communication (QSDC) protocol and a two-way three-party Controlled Quantum Dialogue (CQD) protocol.
We have shown that the proposed protocols are unconditionally secure against various attacks, such as the intercept-
resend attack, the denial of service attack, and the man-in-the-middle attack. The CQD protocol, in particular, is
shown to be secure against an attack by an untrusted Charlie. Also, for the intercept-resend attack, the mutual
information gained between Alice and Eve is shown to be much lower for the proposed protocols as compared to the
qubit based protocols such as the LM05/DL04 protocol [8, 9], thus making the proposed protocols more secure than
the LM05/DL04 against this attack. Also, unlike the qubit based protocols which transfer just one bit per state, the
proposed protocols can transfer multiple bits per state [33], which can possibly lead to advantages such as the faster
transmission of messages and a lower requirement of resources (both subject to practical/experimental conditions).
These direct communication schemes could potentially lead to secure feasible solutions for many social and economic
problems such as the socialist millionaire problem [34], quantum E-commerce [35], quantum voting [36] and the work
towards finding these potential solutions are to be attempted in the future.
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Appendix
LM05/DL04 Protocol
This qubit based protocol was introduced in [8, 9]. In this protocol, the encoding rules for the message sender are
as follows:
To encode the bit 0, do nothing to the incoming qubit.
To encode the bit 1, apply the operator iY = ZX on the incoming qubit. The transformations are as follows:
iY |0〉 = −|1〉
iY |1〉 = |0〉
iY |±〉 = ±|∓〉
The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice chooses n random qubits from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and sends them to Bob.
2. Out of these n qubits received from Alice, Bob randomly chooses n/2 of them and classically sends their
coordinates to Alice.
3. Alice publicly announces the states of the n/2 qubits which Bob chose in step 2. Bob measures each of the n/2
qubits in their corresponding bases and checks for eavesdropping. If the error is within a tolerable limit, then
the protocol continues to step 4. Else, the protocol is discarded and they start all over again.
4. Among the remaining n/2 qubits, Bob randomly chooses n/4 of them and encodes the message in them according
to the encoding rules above and does nothing to the remaining n/4 qubits. He sends all these n/2 qubits back
to Alice.
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5. After Alice confirms receiving the n/2 qubits, Bob sends the coordinates of the qubits on which he didn’t encode
the message. Alice uses these qubits to check for eavesdropping just like how Bob does it in step 3.
6. After confirming no eavesdropping, Alice measures the remaining qubits in their respective bases to obtain the
message sent by Bob.
Mutual Information
Let us take two random variables, say x and y. The mutual information IXY between two random variables x
and y is the decrease in uncertainty of one random variable when the value of the other random variable is observed,
measured or determined. If x and y are discrete, the formula for IXY is given by [37]
IXY =
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y)log2
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(15)
where p(x, y) is the joint probability mass function and p(x) and p(y) are the individual probability mass functions.
If x and y are continuous, then the formula for IXY is given by
IXY =
∫
x
∫
y
p(x, y)log2
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
dxdy (16)
Where p(x, y) is the joint probability density function and p(x) and p(y) are the individual probability density
functions.
There can also be a case where one of the random variables is discrete and the other is continuous. For example, if x
is discrete and y is continuous, then the formula for IXY becomes
IXY =
∑
x
∫
y
p(x, y)log2
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
dy (17)
where p(x) is the probability mass function of x, p(y) is the probability density function of y and p(x, y) is a function
that is a probability density-mass function that is discrete in x and continuous in y.
This concept of mutual information can also be generalized to r = mn > 2 random variables {x1, x2, ..., xm} and
{y1, y2, ..., yn} where xi are discrete and yi are continuous. The generalised mutual information Imutual is given by
[37]
Imutual =
∑
x1,x2,...,xn
∫
y1,...,yn
p(x1, x2, ..., xm, y1, y2, ..., yn)log2
p(x1, x2, ..., xm, y1, y2, ..., yn)
p(x1)p(x2)...p(xm)p(y1)p(y2)...p(yn)
dy1dy2...dyn. (18)
Mutual Information for the intercept-resend attack for the LM05/DL04 protocol:
Let us consider the first transmission from Alice to Bob. In this transmission, Alice first selects either of the four
states and prepares them and sends them to Bob. Eve intercepts this channel before the state reaches Bob and
randomly chooses a basis for each incoming state and measures the state in that basis. Let a, e ∈ {0, 1,+,−}. Let
the probability of Alice sending the qubit a and Eve receiving the qubit e be p(a, e). For example, the probability
p(0, 0) is
p(0, 0) =
probability of Alice choosing 0
1
4
×
probability of Eve choosing the computational Z basis
1
2
×
probability of Eve getting 0
1 =
1
8
. (19)
Similarly,
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p(0, 1) =
1
4
× 1
2
× 0 = 0, (20)
p(0,+) =
1
4
× 1
2
× 1
2
=
1
16
, (21)
p(0,−) = 1
4
× 1
2
× 1
2
=
1
16
, (22)
and similar probabilities for p(1, e), p(+, e), and p(−, e), where e ∈ {0, 1,+,−}.
Hence, the mutual information IAE for the LM05/DL04 protocol is given by
IAE =
∑
a
∑
e
p(a, e)log2
p(a, e)
p(a)p(e)
(23)
= 4( 18 log2
1
8
1
16
+ 116 log2
1
16
1
16
+ 116 log2
1
16
1
16
) = 0.5 .
(We can see that for all a and e, p(a) = p(e) = 14 . Hence, p(a)p(e) =
1
16 ).
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